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Abstract: While a habitus can be described as a disposition towards a certain type of act, such 
a definition is not sufficient to encompass the diversity of uses the medieval thinkers made of 
this concept. It is the aim of this paper to examine the habitus of faith in the voluntarist 
Franciscan tradition in order to illustrate several of its functions and how these varied from 
author to author. Studying how the habitus of faith works for Bonaventure, Peter John Olivi 
and John Duns Scotus allows us to examine different takes on these functions and illustrate 
the variety of possible positions even within a tradition that emphasizes the freedom and 
agency of the moral subject above all. We will emphasize the capacity a habitus grants to pick 
out its proper objects, in the present case, the objects of faith; the capacity to elicit certain acts 
that without it would not have been possible or at least that would not have had the moral 
value the habitus grants them; the capacity to unite several powers in the accomplishment of a 
given act. 
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Introduction 
For all medieval thinkers, habitus are to be thought of as dispositions towards certain types of 
acts. Their first and main function is to condition the way in which an act is done: better, more 
quickly, more easily, or more pleasurably. A simple example is a mind becoming better at 
mental calculation through performing different calculations repeatedly. In medieval terms, 
only one power, the intellect, would be habituated, and only one operation (though it might be 
divided into several sub-operations of the same nature) is concerned: calculating. The more I 
calculate, the quicker my intellect becomes at it and the easier it becomes for it to reach 
results without error. 
The object of the present paper is to determine the precise role of a very specific habitus: 
the habitus of faith. This habitus disposes the agent who possesses it towards acts of faith, 
defined here as acts of intellectual assent to a given object, by which this object is held to be 
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true with firmness, that is with neither hesitation nor fear that the opposite might be true. Acts 
of faith are also free and voluntary in the sense that an act of the will commanding this assent 
to the intellect is required for it to occur and to be firm.  
The habitus of faith is much more complex than a habitus such as the calculating habitus I 
described, in several ways. First, faith is a specific kind of habitus, namely a virtue. This 
means that the acts of faith, towards which it inclines the agent, are supposed to be morally 
good. Therefore, by contrast with the calculating habitus, which concerns any number at all, 
the subject who elicits acts of faith must somehow be able to pick out which objects it is 
morally good to assent to. In other words, the calculating habitus disposes an intellect to a 
certain type of act (adding, multiplying, etc.) whatever its object (any number), while the 
habitus of faith disposes a power (or more than one power; see below) to a certain type of act 
(assenting intellectually or accepting as true) that has a very specific type of object (what must 
be believed by a Catholic). Our first line of inquiry will be to examine the way in which the 
habitus of faith helps, or not, in picking out the right objects of assent. 
Second, faith is a theological virtue, which means that it is given by God to the believer. It 
thus stands to reason that, for our authors, this habitus not only inclines the believer towards 
an act but also makes possible an act that is naturally impossible without this habitus—or at 
least it makes it possible to elicit this act in a way that is naturally impossible without God’s 
help. Otherwise, there seems to be no reason to conceive faith as a God-given habit. Our 
second line of inquiry will be to examine what act, or at least what aspect of an act, the 
habitus of faith makes possible. 
Finally, the habitus of faith predisposes its subject to the act of faith. But this act, 
inasmuch as it is free and virtuous, must be an act of the will, the only power of the soul able 
to have free acts. This act, inasmuch as it is by definition an act of apprehension of something 
as true, must also be an act of the intellect, the power of the soul that can make judgments 
about truth or falsity. Are there two acts (or sub-acts) of faith, one of the will, the other of the 
intellect? Or is there a single act of faith that somehow involves both powers? 
Correspondingly, are there two habitus of faith inclining to two acts, or only one habitus? 
And if there is only one, does it incline the will or the intellect? This will be our third line of 
inquiry. 
These questions will be examined through the study of three Franciscan thinkers: 
Bonaventure2, Peter John Olivi3, and John Duns Scotus4, whose doctrines of faith have 
received little attention until now.5 As far as I know, I provide here the first detailed study of 
the inner workings of the habitus of faith for these authors, in a diachronic perspective. As I 
have shown in previous works,6 Bonaventure simplifies the model inherited from Alexander 
of Hales and his intellectual milieu, and allows for a conception of faith that can be explained 
by resorting only to the intellect and the will. Olivi and Scotus, both influenced by 
Bonaventure, reprise such a view and, in very different ways, emphasize the absolute freedom 
of the act of faith, which proceeds in its core from an act or acts of the will, no matter how the 
objects of faith are known or taught to the believer. 
                                               
2 On Bonaventure’s view of the general characteristics of habitus, see Thompson (1956). 
According to him, in Sent. II, d. 25, p. 1, art. 1, Bonaventure distinguishes three types of 
habitus. One merely describes the unenhanced basic capacities of a power, such as the 
capacity of the mind to know itself; the second one is a real accident added to a given power 
which makes it capable to do something it couldn’t without it, such as when the intellect 
knows mathematical objects through an acquired accident; the third kind of habitus merely 
adds a real relation between faculties. As will become apparent below, if the habitus of faith 
were to find its place within this classfication, it seems it would fit in the second and the third 
categories, as it both adds some new knowledge about objects of faith (that they should be 
believed) and facilitates the interactions between the intellect and the will that result in the 
performance of the act of faith.. 
3 On Olivi’s view of the general characteristics of habitus, see in the present volume 
Toivanen’s chapter, p. 000. 
4 On Scotus’s view of the general characteristics of habitus, see in the present volume 
Boulnois’s chapter, p. 000, and Roques’s chapter, p. 000.  
5 In general, the study of medieval doctrines of faith is, with some exceptions, a recent 
endeavour. See, for instance Aubert (1943, 1946, 1948), Faucher (2014), Faucher and Roques 
(2015), and Grellard (2014a, 2014b). I also quote below some more specific literature on the 
studied authors considered. 
6 Faucher (2015). 
This sharply distinguishes these thirteenth-century Franciscan authors from their 
contemporaries, such as the secular masters Henry of Ghent and Godfrey of Fontaines. Both 
Henry and Godfrey are strongly intellectualist in matters of faith, in that for them the habitus 
of faith given by God is sufficient to produce faithful assent without any more contribution 
from the will than a desire and effort to attend to what should be believed and to examine 
reasons for rather than against believing.7 Aquinas appears to have a similar position.8 By 
contrast, Franciscan authors insist that the agency of the believer is central. The believer not 
only is making himself receptive to God’s grace, but also takes an active part in eliciting the 
act of faith. It is our aim to highlight the diversity of positions within Franciscan thought that 
can result from this common ground. 
The first part of the paper will show how, for Bonaventure, even though the habitus of 
faith is received from God, it never constrains the intellect to assent, but requires an act of the 
will to do so. The habitus of faith has the function of helping both powers in eliciting the 
necessary acts about the appropriate objects. The second part of the paper, devoted to Olivi, 
shows that the latter has a much more naturalistic model: the habitus of faith seems to be 
produced by repeated acts of the will and of the intellect, while a natural instinct distinct from 
faith picks out its objects. Finally, Scotus’s model is a different take on a quasi-naturalistic 
view of faith: the habitus of faith, which is only intellectual, is produced by the will. Only the 
authority of the church can help us to choose what to believe. 
                                               
7 Faucher (2015, ch. 3 and 4). 
8 See Dougherty (2005), Duroux (1956), Grellard (2014a, 35–44), and Michon (2014). 
1. Bonaventure’s view 
To understand the function of the habitus of faith in Bonaventure’s thought, as outlined in his 
commentary of the Sentences,9 one must first understand what characteristics the act of faith 
must have in order to be properly virtuous. Bonaventure paints a fairly clear picture, which is 
in conformity with the authority of Paul the Apostle, who famously states that the intellect 
must be taken captive in the service of Christ (II Cor. 10:5). For Bonaventure, this means that 
the intellect must assent above all else to the supreme truth that is God. This is the only way 
in which a human soul can be righteous (recta). Assenting to God above all else implies 
assenting to Him above oneself, which, for Bonaventure, can happen only when one wills to 
have one’s intellect taken captive in the service of Christ. Rather than trusting one’s own 
intellect in its natural apprehension of what is true, one must want to submit it to God so that 
it holds what God revealed to be true, whether or not it can be proven rationally. 
Willing to capture the intellect in this manner characterizes a righteous will (voluntas). 
The habitus of faith is a virtue inasmuch as it prepares and helps the will to perform this 
operation, and thus contributes to the rectitude (rectitudo) of the will.10 Indeed, though the 
role of a virtue is to facilitate a certain act,11 this does not suffice to define it. The habitus of 
faith would not be a virtue if it did not somehow rectify the will: this is what differentiates it 
from other intellect-illuminating gifts from God, such as the gift of prophecy. The gift of 
                                               
9 For a detailed account of Bonaventure’s doctrine of faith from a theological point of view, 
see Ménard (1974). For a view of Bonaventure’s doctrine on faith in his commentaries to the 
Scripture, see Lorenzin (2014). 
10 Bonaventure, Sent. III, d. 23, art. 1, q. 1 (Bonaventure 1941 [hereafter OTS], 3: 461–462): 
“Iustum enim est ut intellectus noster ita captivetur et subiaceat summae Veritati sicut affectus 
noster debet subiacere summae Bonitati; nec potest esse anima recta, nisi intellectus summae 
Veritati propter se et super omnia assentiat et affectus summae Bonitati adhaereat. Hanc 
autem rectitudinem non habet quis nolens, sed volens. Nemo enim plus credit Deo quam sibi, 
nisi per hoc quod vult intellectum suum captivare in obsequium Christi. Si ergo captivatio 
intellectus in obsequium summae Veritatis spectat ad rectitudinem vitae, voluntas, qua quis 
vult sic se captivare, est voluntas recta, et habitus, quo mediante ad hoc expeditur et adiuvatur, 
facit ad voluntatis rectitudinem.” 
11 Bonaventure, Sent. III, d. 23, art. 1, q. 2 (OTS 3: 466): “Virtus etiam est habitus reddens 
potentiam facilem respectu alicuius actus.” 
prophecy illuminates the intellect just as faith does, and both help it to apprehend the same 
objects (they are ad eadem). But the will does not contribute anything to the prophetic 
illumination: prophets merely receive intellectual knowledge supernaturally imparted by God. 
Thus, the gift of prophecy cannot be called a virtue.12 
Thus it is necessary for the will to contribute to the act of faith. There are two distinct 
reasons for this: first, because the truth that is faithfully believed cannot be seen; second, 
because this truth is salutary and thus it is to be believed meritoriously.13 So the will is 
required because the intellect, left alone, could not believe unseen—that is, non-evident and 
unproven—truths, as it believes the objects of science, which are evident and/or proven.14 The 
will is also required because the act of faithful belief, inasmuch as it is meritorious, must be 
free and thus voluntary. The causal power of the will is not enough, however, because no one 
can assent to the divine truth for itself and above all else without divine help.15 So the habitus 
of faith allows for a direct reliance on God’s authority that makes the meritorious act of faith 
possible and gives the will strength to command faithful assent to the divine truth. 
                                               
12 Bonaventure, Sent. III, d. 23, art. 1, q. 2 (OTS 3: 468): “Numquam enim fides esset virtus, 
quantumcumque intellectum illuminaret, nisi etiam voluntatem quodam modo rectificaret, 
sicut patet in dono prophetiae: quia illuminat intellectum ad eadem ad quae illuminat fides, et 
tamen non ponitur esse virtus, quoniam in illa illuminatione non cooperatur voluntas, 
secundum quod cooperatur in fidei assensu et actu.” 
13 Bonaventure, Sent. III, d. 23, art. 1, q. 1 (OTS 3: 462–463): “Est enim in veritatem non 
visam et veritatem salutiferam. Quia enim non visa est, creditur voluntarie; quia autem non 
solum non visa, sed etiam salutifera, creditur voluntarie et meritorie.” 
14 Bonaventure, Sent. III, d. 23, art. 1, q. 1 (OTS 3:462–463): “Dicendum est quod aliter 
verum est obiectum fidei, aliter obiectum scientiae. Scientiae, inquam, obiectum est, quia est 
verum visum; fidei autem est obiectum, quia est verum: verum inquam, non visum, sed 
salutiferum. Quia enim est non visum, requiritur ad ipsum cognoscendum alius habitus quam 
sit habitus scientiae. Quia salutiferum, deo habitus ille ad salutem ordinat et ad vitam beatam, 
et ideo habet rationem virtutis completam. Et sic patet quod nihil impedit quin fides possit 
esse in verum et tamen nihilominus esse virtus, pro eo quod alio modo est in verum quam 
scientia, secundum duplicem conditionem praeassignatam.” 
15 Bonaventure, Sent. III, d. 23, art. 2, q. 2 (OTS 3: 481): “[D]icendum quod credere, 
secundum quod est actus fidei-virtutis, debetur auctoritati, non cuilibet, sed auctoritati 
divinae, cui quidem auctoritati nemo assentit propter se et super omnia nisi per divinam 
illuminationem; et sic talis credulitas non est acquisita, sed infusa.” 
This does not mean, however, that the habitus of faith merely helps the will. Indeed, it is 
also a habitus of the intellect in two different respects. First, it is through this habitus that the 
intellect is taken captive and relies on the supreme truth that is God, and so it is a habitus of 
the intellect, taken as speculative, i.e. as capable of grasping something as a truth. Second, it 
is also through this habitus that the intellect is made capable of assenting not according to its 
own judgment but according to the command of the will (or the inclination of the affectus, 
which is synonymous16). 
So the habitus of faith disposes a rational agent towards the act of faith, which consists in 
the intellect assenting to the supreme truth that is God, above all else and by the command of 
the will, in three different ways: it helps the will to command this assent, it helps the intellect 
to comply with this command, and it helps the intellect to actually accomplish the act of 
assent that is commanded.17 Basically, the habitus of faith eases every step of the way leading 
to the act of faith, whichever power of the soul is primarily concerned at each step. The 
habitus of faith is thus chiefly defined by the ultimate intellectual act it helps to perfect. This 
seems to be a fairly complicated way to define the act and habitus of faith, but it is 
nonetheless the result of an effort towards simplification. Indeed, Bonaventure inherits from 
his predecessors quite a complex view of the powers of the soul. In this view, given that every 
virtue is the principle of merit and praise, it must be posited in the power of the soul which is 
the principle of praiseworthy and meritorious acts. That power is none other than liberum 
                                               
16 In Bonaventure, the term affectus is another name for the will, i.e. for the power of the soul 
which elicits acts of volition and acts of affection, such as emotion regarding a certain object. 
17 Bonaventure, Sent. III, d. 23, art. 1, q. 2 (OTS 3: 466–467): “[S]i fides habitus est per quem 
intellectus captivatur in obsequium Christi et innititur primae Veritati propter se, et hoc modo 
dicitur intellectus quodam modo speculativus, necesse est quod habitus fidei quodam modo sit 
in intellectu secundum quod habet rationem speculativi. – Et quoniam intellectus non 
habilitatur ad assentiendum ipsi Veritati primae secundum suum iudicium, sed secundum 
voluntatis imperium, ideo fides non respicit intellectum tamquam pure speculativum, sed 
necessarium est quod ipsa sit in ipso intellectu secundum quod est quodam modo extensus et 
ab affectu inclinatus. – Rursus, quoniam ipsum velle credere est essentiale ipsi fidei, hinc est 
quod habitus ille non tantum respicit intellectum ut speculatur summam Veritatem nec etiam 
ut inclinatur ab affectu, sed etiam ipsum affectum.” 
arbitrium, which is therefore where every virtue is to be posited.18 In turn, liberum arbitrium 
is composed of three different powers: the rational, the concupiscible and the irascible, 
divided according to the type of operation accomplished by liberum arbitrium.19 This 
provides an even more precise way to locate the habitus of faith in the soul: as its act is of 
grasping a truth, it is an act of the rational. 
It might be said that Bonaventure’s is a functionalist definition of habitus: every 
characteristic that it has is subordinated to its one defining property: facilitating the act of 
faith taken as a truth-grasping, intellectual act. That a habitus, as well as its location within 
the soul, is defined according to the ultimate act it helps accomplish, even though several 
different acts of several different powers might be involved in the process, is nothing to be 
surprised at, for Bonaventure. Indeed, for him, the habitus of science, for instance, facilitates 
at least two acts of two different powers:20 the retention of a species by memory and the 
turning towards it by intelligence. What is important is that there is a certain continuity 
between the different powers involved, just as health is to be attributed to several different 
members of a given body and the health of one affects the health of another, even though to 
                                               
18 Bonaventure, Sent. III, d. 23, art. 1, q. 2 (OTS 3: 466): “Si ergo virtus est principium laudis 
et meriti necessarium est eam poni in illa potentia animae quae est principium primum operis 
laudabilis et meritorii. Nam si poneretur in potentia inferiori, tunc virtus potentiae naturalis 
imperaret virtuti gratuitae. Si ergo liberum arbitrium principium est meriti et demeriti, necesse 
est omnem virtutem in libero arbitrio poni.” 
19 The rational is the power that elicits acts aimed at attaining true objects, such as 
propositions taken to be true; the concupiscible elicits acts aimed at attaining good objects, 
such as objects loved and desired; the irascible elicits acts aimed at attaining objects that are 
hard to get. See Bonaventure, Sent. III, d. 23, art. 1, q. 2 (OTS 3: 466): “Rursus, cum habitus 
sit in ea potentia circa cuius actum explicat difficultatem, et virtus sit habitus, necesse est eam 
reperiri in ea potentia sicut in subiecto quam ad opus habilitat. Quoniam igitur quaedam 
virtutes explicant actus rationalis, quaedam actus concupiscibilis, quaedam actus irascibilis, 
ideo quasdam necesse est poni in rationali, quasdam in concupiscibili, quasdam in irascibili.” 
20 The notion of power of the soul is here to be understood in its broadest sense as any 
identifiable faculty to which a certain kind of act can be attributed. For instance, acts of 
memory and intelligence are acts of the intellect. 
be healthy is not the same for the heart and for the stomach.21 In the same way, though 
intellect and will do not contribute to the act of faith in the same way, their acts are 
nonetheless facilitated by the same habitus in order to elicit an act of faith. 
Bonaventure thus accepts that the habitus of faith is located in a number of different 
powers, given his functionalist definition of habitus. Nonetheless, his discussion of the 
different aspects of the act of faith boils down to a distinction between the respective 
contributions of the intellect and the will. The intellect (also called reason, not to be confused 
with the rational) is charged with the material aspect of the act, while the will is charged with 
its formal aspect.22 The difference between these aspects is easily illustrated by the case of the 
small child, who has received the supernatural habitus of faith. This child has what is formal 
in the habitus of faith, namely the readiness and ease in assenting to every article of faith if 
they are presented to him once he is an adult. But he has none of the material aspect of the 
habitus, i.e. he knows none of the objects that he is supposed to believe.23 This is what makes 
teaching the objects of faith essential, because if they are not taught, then the habitus has no 
                                               
21 Bonaventure, Sent. III, d. 23, art. 1, q. 2 (OTS 3: 467): “[H]abitus scientiae quoad quid 
respicit memoriam, scilicet quoad retentionem speciei, et quoad quid intelligentiam, scilicet 
quoad facilitatem conversionis, et tamen dicitur unus habitus simplex. Quamvis enim 
potentiae distinctae sint, nihilominus tamen continuari habent in uno subiecto, ratione cuius 
potest esse in eis unitas proprietatis, sicut una sanitas ponitur esse in multis membris corporis 
interius.” 
22 Bonaventure, Sent. III, d. 23, art. 1, q. 2 (OTS 3: 467): “[N]ihil impedit dicere unam et 
eamdem virtutem esse simul in libero arbitrio et ratione et voluntate, quia […] liberum 
arbitrium non dicit potentiam distinctam a ratione et voluntate secundum rem et essentiam, 
immo, secundum quod vult beatus Augustinus, liberum arbitrium complectitur tres potentias, 
scilicet irascibilem, concupiscibilem et rationalem. Et ideo nullum inconveniens est quod 
unaquaeque virtus, quae reponitur in unaquaque illarum potentiarum secundum quod habitus, 
in libero arbitrio reponatur secundum quod virtus et meriti principium. – Similiter nullum est 
inconveniens ponere unum habitum esse in ratione et voluntate, ita quod unam illarum 
potentiarum respiciat quantum ad actum materialem, alteram quantum ad actum formalem.” 
23 Bonaventure, Sent. III, d. 23, art. 2, q. 2, ad 5 (OTS 3: 482): “[P]arvulus habet habitum fidei 
quantum ad illud quod est in ea formale; habet enim aliquid quo promptus erit et facilis ad 
assentiendum omnibus articulis fidei, si ei proponantur cum ad adultam aetatem pervenerit. 
Caret tamen ea cognitione quae est materialis respectu fidei, sine qua, etsi illud formale possit 
in animam parvuli infundi, non tamen potest radicari et stabiliri.” 
opportunity to be brought into act and can easily be expelled from the soul of the baptized, 
who will fall into error just as easily as if he had never received it in the first place.24 
But the question is: what exactly happens when the baptized actually learns the objects of 
faith? Do they immediately appear to him as true? If this were the case, then there would be 
no place for the will, because the intellect could easily adhere to them without it, nor would 
there be any freedom in the act of faith. Nonetheless, Richard of St Victor, quoted by 
Bonaventure, famously defines an article of faith as that which constrains (arctat) us to 
believe.25 How could this be? The solution, for Bonaventure, is to define constraint (arctatio) 
in two ways: the constraint which is incompatible with freedom and the constraint which is 
incompatible with ambiguity. Only the second definition characterizes an article of faith. It 
works “by removing ambiguity, because the mind of the believer is fixed in a determinate 
way in the truth of the article, so that it is in no way inclined towards another side.”26 I 
suggest that this admittedly (and ironically) ambiguous passage should be interpreted in the 
following way: though the intellect is not able to directly apprehend the truth of the articles of 
faith, it nonetheless appears unambiguously good to adhere to this truth. It is then the 
responsibility of the will to act upon this appearance of goodness or not. 
To summarize: for Bonaventure, the habitus of faith is defined by what it helps to 
accomplish, namely the act of faith. It does this by making it possible, as a gratuitous gift 
                                               
24 Bonaventure, Sent. III, d. 23, art. 2, q. 2, ad 5 (OTS 3: 482): “Et propterea, si, cum ad 
adultam aetatem pervenerit, proponatur ei error sub ratione credibili, facillime expellitur 
habitus fidei, et ita de facili assentit ac si habitum fidei nunquam habuisset, propter hoc quod 
liberum arbitrium propter inassuetudinem nescit illo uti et ille habitus non fuit in potentia 
radicatus, quamvis esset in ea infusus.” 
25 Bonaventure, Sent. III, d. 24, art. 3, q. 2 (OTS 3: 520): “Richardus definit articulum prout 
est obiectum fidei generaliter, et ideo dicit quod est ‘arctans nos ad credendum’.” 
26 Bonaventure, Sent. III, d. 24, art. 3, q. 1, ad 6 (OTS 3: 519): “[D]icendum est quod est 
arctatio quae repugnat libertati et est arctatio quae repugnat ambiguitati; et cum dicitur 
articulus, quia arctat ad credendum, hoc non dicitur per coactionem voluntatis, sed hoc dicitur 
per remotionem ambiguitatis, quia in ipsa veritate articuli determinate figitur mens credentis, 
ut nullatenus ad partem aliam inclinetur.” 
from God, to directly rely on Him in believing in the truths of faith in such a way that this 
belief is meritorious. If my hypothesis is correct, the habitus of faith also makes it so that the 
objects of faith appear as unambiguously good objects of belief, i.e. that it appears morally 
good to believe them. Finally, the habitus of faith facilitates the act of the will by which it 
commands the intellect’s act of belief, it makes the intellect receptive to this command, and 
finally, it makes it easier for the intellect to actually comply with this command and to believe 
what it ought to believe. So the habitus of faith appears to have three distinct functions: it 
allows for a meritorious act (a common feature of all theological virtues); it modifies the way 
in which believers apprehend objects of faith; and it facilitates every act leading to the act of 
faith, in the proper sense of assenting to the truth of an object of faith. Are these functions 
similarly distinguished and accepted by Olivi and Scotus? 
2. Olivi’s view 
Olivi’s doctrine of faith27 displays a peculiar absence of reflection on the supernatural or 
natural character of the act and habitus of faith, and of the typical vocabulary used to talk 
about this distinction (infused vs. acquired, formed vs. unformed, which frequently appear in 
the doctrines of most other authors28). Olivi seems to be uninterested in the subject, especially 
as regards the question of the link between grace and meritorious belief, which is entirely 
absent. However, a deeper examination shows that he actually endeavours to develop a 
conception of faith which both is natural and allows for the direct reliance on God that 
Bonaventure thought was possible only thanks to supernatural grace. It is only against the 
background of such a doctrine that Olivi’s account of the role of the habitus of faith can be 
understood. 
                                               
27 For discussion of this, see my introduction in Olivi (2017); see also Stadter (1960). 
28 See for instance Lottin (1949). 
Before examining the psychological mechanism behind the act of faith in Olivi, I will first 
examine how, according to him, it is possible to determine what should be believed. For Olivi, 
everything begins with the mere conception of God as the supreme being, and of His supreme 
justice, power, and goodness. A natural instinct (naturalis or even naturalissimus instinctus) 
to fear, revere, and love God then kicks in: 
 Indeed, right away, by a certain most natural instinct, from the sense of its 
own inferiority, the mind senses that it can have a superior whom it ought to 
fear or revere—even more, [it is] as if it sensed [this superior being] itself.29 
Such an apprehension constitutes the motivation for believing in God’s existence (credere 
Deum) and adhering by faith to what God says (Deo per fidem adhaerere) ever more 
perfectly. It therefore must precede belief.30 
This apprehension is nonetheless considered to be divine testimony, or divine relucentia.31 
This term, which one might translate as God’s “shining,” seems to refer to God’s appearing to 
us as a principle and an end (in the different ways underlined above, i.e. as an object of 
reverence, fear, and love). This entails belief in God and the various truths of faith, not 
                                               
29 Peter John Olivi, Quaestiones de Deo cognoscendo, q. 3 (ed. Jansen, 544): “[C]um [mens] 
audit vel per se concipit altitudinem summi entis summamque eius iustitiam et potestatem et 
bonitatem, quodam naturali instinctu timore tam reverentiae quam poenae concutitur et in 
ipsius cogitatu et auditu admirationis stupore repletur et quodam naturali amore eius 
afficitur. Statim enim quodam naturalissimo instinctu ex sensu inferioritatis sentit se posse 
habere superius quem timere et revereri debeat, immo, acsi ipsum sentiret, mens cogitatu vel 
auditu sic afficitur, quantum est de se vi naturalis instinctus.” 
30 Olivi’s conception of this sense of a superior being seems strikingly similar to Calvin’s 
famous sensus divinitatis (also defined in terms of a natural instinct), both in the idea that 
God’s existence, or at least its possibility, can be sensed and that this knowledge of God 
comes with a feeling of moral duty. This does not seem, however, to be articulated with any 
form of doxastic voluntarism or direct link between affect and belief in Calvin. On this sensus 
divinitatis, see Helm (1998). 
31 Peter John Olivi, Quaestiones de virtutibus, qq. 8–9, ed. Stadter (Peter John Olivi 1981, 
354.20–30): “[S]ufficit quod prius apprehendat in aliquo objecto rationem finis vel 
principalitatis solum cogitando quid est quod dicitur per nomen; non autem oportet quod prius 
hoc credat aut iudicet ita esse, sicut in praecedenti quaestione satis est ostensum. Quando 
autem dicimus quod nos credimus Deo propter se et cetera propter ipsum, non est sensus quod 
illa credamus propter hoc quod ipse sit, sed potius quod propter hoc credimus illa, ut 
perfectius Deum credamus et ut perfectius Deo per fidem adhaereamus. Vel sensus est quod 
credimus illa propter Deum testificantem illa et in illis quodammodo relucentem.” 
inasmuch as they are true but inasmuch as belief in them leads to worshipping and believing 
in God in a better and more dutiful way. In other words, God is the principle and end of belief 
because belief is one of the ways we do our duties to Him. Our desire to do them follows from 
the love we acquire for Him from merely apprehending the concept of God, even before we 
posit His existence. When it comes to how we can determine what precisely we should 
believe in this way, Olivi again uses the concept of relucentia: 
The uncreated truth shines in them majestically and as a principle and 
overexcessively; but other truths shine here as coherent with it, subordinated to 
it and leading to it as to the ultimate end. It also shines universally and 
fundamentally everywhere in all truths of faith and in all testimonies for it; 
which is not to be said of the other [truths].32 
Thus, if we are to accept that the apprehension of God as the dutiful object of our love and 
faith is a case of relucentia, and that this apprehension is nothing but the entering into action 
of a natural instinct, it stands to reason that we are similarly able to naturally distinguish, in 
the truths of faith as well as in the testimonies in favour of faith, that we should believe them 
in order to dutifully worship God in different ways.33 
For Bonaventure, distinguishing what should be believed was possible only through the 
supernatural habitus of faith. We can conjecture that, for Olivi, such a distinction is naturally 
possible thanks to a natural instinct that is not faith, but merely what guides us towards it.34 In 
any case, no mention is made of divinely infused faith, be it formed or unformed. 
                                               
32 Peter John Olivi, Quaestiones de virtutibus, qq. 8–9 (ed. Stadter, 354.4–9): “Veritas enim 
increata relucet in eis maiestative et principative et superexcessive; reliquae vero relucent ibi 
ut illi cohaerentes et subordinatae et in ipsam tamquam in ultimum finem ducentes. Ipsa etiam 
universaliter et fundamentaliter relucet ubique in omnibus veritatibus fidei et in omnibus 
testimoniis eius; quod non est sic dare de aliis.” 
33 Peter John Olivi, Quaestiones de virtutibus, qq. 8–9 (ed. Stadter, 345.9–12): “[G]eneralis 
ratio obiectiva fidei […] est aut veritas divinitus proposita ad credendum et colendum Deum, 
aut veritas necessaria ad debite credendum et colendum Deum, aut veritas credibilis perfecte 
in Deum ducens.” 
34 That such an instinct exists puts into question the meaning of the notion of revealed truth 
but no more than the existence of an infused faith that would be able to infallibly point us to 
Having established this, we must now understand what is the precise relation between 
God and the other objects of faith appearing to us as credenda, and the actual act, or acts, of 
faith. For Olivi, the subjective certainty that is characteristic of faith requires that all doubt 
regarding the truth of the objects of faith be pushed aside, or at least that it not be stronger 
than the appearance of this truth, and also that the adherence to this truth be fixed and 
unmovable. This is made possible by the will as causa motiva, though acts of faith are 
ultimately acts of the intellect.35 Indeed, for Olivi, it is possible for the will to “apply” the 
intellect to an object so that the more strongly it is applied to it, the more intensely it assents 
to it.36 In a way, it could be said that Olivi’s doctrine of voluntary certainty follows from his 
theory of attention: the intellect’s attention can be focused so strongly on an object that it 
becomes united to it37 and ends up assenting to its truth.38 Such a voluntary assent, however, 
is possible only when the object of faith is presented sub modo debito (i.e. as something that 
                                                                                                                                                   
what ought to be believed. Indeed, when one is granted that kind of “compass”, then the fact 
that such or such object has been revealed by God at a certain point in history, by a certain 
medium ceases to be the motivation or reason for belief. Rather, the reason is to be found in 
the pointing of the “compass”. It may be said that revelation consists precisely in this 
pointing. Nonetheless, historical revelation remains of crucial importance, since neither 
infused faith nor Olivi’s instinct provide the content of the objects of faith to the believers. 
This content has to be passed down from a historical revelation, so that it can be recognized 
by the faithful thanks to their “compass”. 
35 Peter John Olivi, Quaestiones de virtutibus, qq. 8–9 (ed. Stadter, 329.1–8): “[C]ertitudo 
fidei duo aut tria in se includit. Primum est realis et infallibilis veritas creditorum. – 
Secundum est firma et inconcussibilis adhaesio ad veritatem creditam, repellens a credente 
omnem dubietatem aut saltem eius aequiparantiam respectu sensus veritatis creditae et fixae 
adhaesionis ad ipsam. Duo autem ultima possunt dari a voluntate tamquam a causa motiva, 
quamvis actus illi immediate eliciantur ab intellectu.” 
36 Peter John Olivi, Quaestiones de virtutibus, qq. 8–9 (ed. Stadter, 321.15–20): “[I]ntellectus 
movetur et applicatur a voluntate ad illa quae volumus cogitare, et secundum hoc quod magis 
volumus vel nolumus, majus et minus applicatur vel retrahitur. Constat autem quod quanto 
fortius applicatur, tanto ceteris paribus fortiori nexu invisceratur et unitur suo obiecto, ac per 
consequens et tanto firmius et intensius assentit.” 
37 It is not obvious what such a unity is. It seems to me that “united” may be understood as 
meaning that the intellect becomes focused only on the object of faith, stops considering that 
any alternative might be true and accepts as true only that which is antecedent or follows from 
the object in question. An example might be that of a scholar who, for a variety of reasons, 
becomes strongly attached to a hypothesis she first put forward, embraces it wholeheartedly 
and refuses for not entirely rational motives to question it afterwards. 
38 On this theory, see Pasnau (1997, 130–134, 168–181); Toivanen (2013, 25–42, 141–191). 
must be believed to dutifully worship God) and the will is divinely “affected, erected, and 
invigorated” to do it.39 
Now, we may interpret this as meaning that in order to command belief the will needs 
some sort of supernatural divine help. To be sure, Olivi sometimes alludes to a habitus of 
faith that must be in the soul before any act of faith can be accomplished and which is thus not 
acquired by the repetition of such acts,40 and this usually refers, as in Bonaventure’s case, to 
supernaturally infused faith. However, another interpretation is possible. For Olivi, we can, in 
ordinary circumstances, believe without evidence, and even against the evidence if we have a 
practical reason to do so, for instance when we maintain the belief that our friend is innocent 
despite overwhelming evidence, simply because we love him.41 Since voluntary belief is a 
natural possibility (a possibility which is not clearly admitted by Bonaventure), then divine 
help seems superfluous. What is not superfluous is that it should appear somehow good to the 
will to cause the intellect to believe, for without this what reason would the will have to act? 
This is precisely the role of the aforementioned natural instinct. Indeed, as Olivi explains, 
since faith is a habitus voluntarius, it requires a final cause, which is God.42 And, as 
mentioned above, it is because of this natural instinct that God can appear as a final cause. 
                                               
39 Peter John Olivi, Quaestiones de virtutibus, qq. 8–9 (ed. Stadter, 329.8–11): “Non tamen 
possunt sibi quomodocumque dari, immo oportet objectum prius sub modo debito sibi 
proponi et ipsammet voluntatem ad sic movendum intellectum divinitus affici et erigi ac 
vigorari.” 
40 See Peter John Olivi, Quaestiones in secundum librum Sententiarum, q. 74 (ed. Jansen, 3: 
117–118); see also Toivanen’s article in the present volume, p. 000. 
41 Peter John Olivi, Quaestiones de virtutibus, qq. 8–9 (ed. Stadter, 321.5–8): “[C]onstat quod 
potest amore affici nunc ad hoc, nunc ad oppositum, et libentius consentire in unum eorum 
credendum quam in reliquum. Unde et videmus multos libentius credere et praesumere mala 
de inimico quam de amico, et bona libentius et facilius de amico quam de inimico, quamquam 
plures rationes habeant pro parte contraria quam pro sua.” 
42 Peter John Olivi, Quaestiones de virtutibus, qq. 8–9 (ed. Stadter, 349.15–18): “Quia enim 
fides est habitus voluntarius, ideo in se includit habitudinem causae finalis, qua propter Deum 
volumus credere omnia quae credimus, ut scilicet debite inhaereamus, saltem quoad 
rectitudinem credendi.” 
We know now that for Olivi the habitus of faith is a habitus of the will. Its function is 
likely to help the will in causing the intellect to be united with the object of faith so that it 
assents to it. But it is also a habitus of the intellect, since it has to do with both the consent of 
the will and the assent of the intellect.43 Olivi defines the function of the habitus in 
unmistakably intellectualist terms: it makes the object of faith appear as true, and truer and 
more credible than its opposite.44 
So the habitus of faith is a habitus of both the will and the intellect. Does this mean that it 
should be defined, as it is in Bonaventure, by the act it ultimately helps perfect, independently 
of the powers it is in and which it disposes? Olivi does not answer this question, but examines 
two possibilities without rejecting either: either the habitus of faith is composed of partial 
habitus or it is one habitus.45 In the first case, the partial habitus must be considered as 
causing each other, the habitus in the will being the cause of the habitus in the intellect, and 
the habitus that has God as its object being the cause of the habitus that concern the other 
objects of faith. In other words, the habitus which disposes the will to the voluntary act of 
causing the intellect to assent causes the habitus which disposes the intellect to the act of 
assenting; and the habitus that dispose the will to the act of loving God and the intellect to 
thus believing in God cause the habitus that dispose the intellect to acts of believing all that 
                                               
43 Peter John Olivi, Quaestiones de virtutibus, qq. 8–9 (ed. Stadter, 342.4–6): “[Q]uidam sunt 
habitus et actus, qui in sua essentia includunt meram subiectionem et subiectam adhaesionem 
ad Deum, ita quod sunt idem quod habitualis vel actualis innisus, quo mens principaliter 
innititur soli Deo; et huiusmodi est fides, non solum quantum ad consensum voluntatis, sed 
etiam quantum ad assensum intellectus.” 
44 Peter John Olivi, Quaestiones de virtutibus, qq. 8–9 (ed. Stadter, 327.22–26): “[H]abitus 
fidei facit quod obiectum eius sibi occurrat ut verum et ut verius et credibilius quam suum 
oppositum; sicut et caritas facit quod inimicus occurrat sibi ut diligibilis et quod bonum 
inaccessibile occurrat nobis ut accessibile, ac per consequens ut amabile.” 
45 Peter John Olivi, Quaestiones de virtutibus, qq. 8–9 (ed. Stadter, 354.11–19): “[S]ecundum 
quosdam una pars fidei seu unus partialis habitus eius est quodammodo causa alterius, ita 
quod habitus qui est in voluntate, est causa eius qui est in intellectu, et habitus qui est 
[respectu] Dei immediate, est aliquo modo causa habitus quo creduntur alia propter Deum. – 
Dato autem quod non sit ita, potest dici quod etiam unus habitus potest esse diversorum 
inaequaliter; sicut et punctus aliter est partium lineae, quarum est immediatus nexus vel 
terminus, aliter illarum quas solum respicit mediate.” 
has to be believed for God to be revered and believed in properly. If the habitus of faith is to 
be considered one habitus, however, Olivi seems to think this is no problem, since one 
habitus can relate to different powers and objects differently. This is akin to Bonaventure’s 
position, described above. 
Now, we have seen that Olivi mentions that the habitus of faith must be there for acts of 
faith to occur,46 and I indicated that this could refer to a supernatural habitus. It is indeed quite 
probable, as no other author of the time thought that a properly virtuous act was possible 
without any infused disposition. However, it might also refer to acquired faith;indeed, given 
the close connection between his theory of attention and his theory of voluntary belief, and 
that focusing the intellect’s attention on something is an act, it is quite possible that the 
volitional act of commanding belief causes the intellectual act of believing. But it might also 
be that this volitional act rather causes the habitus to be produced in the intellect, and only 
then would the intellect assent because of the habitus, working as a filter making the object of 
faith appear true. Faith would then be required for acts of faith, and not acquired by its acts; 
but it would be acquired nonetheless. 
 In the present volume, Juhana Toivanen writes: 
One of the most interesting aspects of Olivi’s theory of the cognitive role of 
habitus is the distinction he makes between dispositions that make one person 
quick to learn and understand on the one hand, and dispositions that change the 
mode of assenting on the other.47 
It is interesting to note that Olivi’s conception of the habitus of faith seems to correspond to 
the second type of disposition as regards the intellect, and to the first type of disposition 
regarding the will. Indeed, while the habitus of faith (or the relevant partial habitus) disposes 
the intellect to apprehending the objects of faith as true, the same habitus (or the relevant 
                                               
46 See note 33 above. 
47 See Juhana Toivanen’s article in the present volume, p. 000. 
partial habitus) disposes the will not to perceiving objects as good, but to better (more 
intensely, more fixedly) causing the intellect to assent. 
To summarize, Olivi’s conception of the habitus of faith allows for a very articulated 
understanding of the act of faith and what leads to it. An instinct at first presents God as 
having to be worshipped and believed in. Upon this presentation, the will loves Him and 
causes the intellect to believe in Him. Afterwards, the will causes the intellect to believe all 
truths of faith that appear to have to be believed in order to better worship and believe in God.  
We can say that Olivi’s conception of the habitus of faith and its function is markedly 
different from Bonaventure’s conception. First, Olivi’s doctrine allows for supernatural 
elements but does not require them. To know what must be believed, an instinct appears to be 
enough, and the process by which the will causes the intellect to actually believe occurs 
naturally in us. For Bonaventure, the habitus of faith is required in order to know what ought 
to be believed, and he does not explicitly say that the will can naturally cause the intellect to 
believe. Second, and concomitantly with this naturalization of the process leading to the act of 
faith, it is clear that the habitus of faith plays a less important role in Olivi than in 
Bonaventure, since the identification of the objects of faith is a function of instinct and not of 
habitus. Finally, though Olivi accepts that the habitus of faith can be one, as it is for 
Bonaventure, even though it disposes different powers to different acts, he sketches another 
possible conception, where the habitus of faith is divided into several partial habitus that are 
defined by their objects and the power in which they inhere. 
3. Scotus’s view 
We will now see how these tendencies in Olivi appear to be even more salient in Scotus. 
Scotus’s conception of faith,48 by comparison with the previous conceptions examined, is 
peculiar in that it prominently features the use of the principle of parsimony in deciding which 
kind of faith—that is, supernaturally infused or naturally acquired—should be posited. In fact, 
Scotus uses a dual principle of parsimony. First is the general principle, according to which 
several things should not be posited when one is enough.49 In the present case, the idea is that 
only as many habitus as necessary should be posited to account for our acts. If our act of faith, 
as we know it by inner perception, can be explained by an acquired habitus, then no other 
habitus, infused faith included, should be posited. 
Second, without explicitly articulating it, Scotus uses what might be called a naturalistic 
variant of the principle of parsimony, according to which everything in our common 
experience that can be explained by natural mechanisms must be so explained; supernatural 
elements should be used only when they are absolutely necessary to account for what we 
experience or are explicitly posited by Scripture and the Catholic church.50 As can be 
expected, such a model drastically reduces the role of the supernatural, but it also does away 
with one of the main features of previous models, namely the capacity of the believer to 
unambiguously determine what should be believed, whether by infused habitus or by natural 
instinct. 
                                               
48 I will be quoting Scotus’s questions on faith in both the Lectura (Lect.) and Reportatio 
(Rep.), as well as the Quodlibet (Quodl.). The texts of book III, questions 23 and 25 are 
almost identical in the Lectura and the Reportatio, but sometimes one of them will give a 
more detailed account or nuance that is absent from the other. Scotus’s questions on faith 
have been recently examined by Staudinger (2006) and Poppi (2014). 
49 John Duns Scotus, Lect. III, d. 23, nn. 2–3 (Vat. 21: 97): “Ad omnem certitudinem actus 
credendi quem experimur in nobis talium credibilium, sufficit nobis fides acquisita; ergo 
superfluit ponere fidem infusam. Consequentia patet, quia non ponitur habitus nisi propter 
actum, et superfluit ponere plura quando unum sufficit.” 
50 For more conceptual and historical detail on this use of the principle of economy, see 
Faucher (forthcoming).  
For Scotus, it is clear that firm belief does not require anything but acquired faith. Just as I 
believe in stories told or written by famous men, similarly it is enough that the Catholic 
church tells me that the men who wrote the Gospels were truthful for me to believe them.51 
Why then would one have to rely on infused faith? Scotus suggests that it could be for two 
reasons: infused faith, as opposed to acquired faith, would make it impossible to doubt or to 
be deceived in one’s assent.52 Scotus rejects both possibilities. Indeed, for him, it belongs to 
the very definition of faith to be incompatible with doubt. If one is to accept the existence of 
acquired faith, one has to accept that we can naturally be free of doubt. As for the possibility 
of deception, Scotus thinks that having this or that habitus has nothing to do with the 
possibility of deception. For him, one does not run the risk of being deceived by having a 
certain habitus or the corresponding assent; it is only in the way a certain object is presented 
to the believer that he might be deceived.53 This view is thus Scotus’s equivalent of Olivi’s 
                                               
51 John Duns Scotus, Lect. III, d. 23, n. 14 (Vat. 21: 101): “Sed tunc, si nulla esset fides 
infusa, crederem tamen fide acquisita historiis librorum Canonis, propter auctoritatem 
Ecclesiae: sic credo, quemadmodum aliis historiis a viris famosis scriptis et narratis. Credo 
igitur fide acquisita Evangelio, quia Ecclesia tenet scriptores veraces esse, – quod ego 
audiens, acquiro mihi habitum credendi eorum dictis.” 
52 John Duns Scotus, Lect. III, d. 23, nn. 52–54 (Vat. 21: 117–118): “[Q]uando dicis fidem 
infusam poni necessario ut firmiter assentiret creditis, aut intelligis quod per illam assentit 
quis ita firmiter quod non possit non assentire vel dubitare de eo cui assentit, – vel quod 
assentit infallibiliter, id est indeceptibiliter, quod non decipitur in assensu suo: Si primo modo 
loquaris, sic est de fide acquisita, quia stante illa fide et dum homo assentit alicui obiecto per 
illam, non potest dubitare vel non assentire, aliter de eodem obiecto et sub eadem ratione esset 
fides sive adhaesio et resilitio vel dubitatio, et ita opposita, – quod falsum est; ergo propter 
firmam adhaesionem non oportet ponere fidem infusam. Si propter hoc quod indeceptibiliter 
adhaeret et infallibiliter, assentiendo per fidem infusam (potest autem falli per adhaesionem 
fidei acquisitae), – contra: ‘decipi’ vel ‘non decipi’ non est a parte habitus, nec ex parte 
assensus quem facit, sed ex parte obiecti secundum quod obiectum – in quod assentit – 
praesentatur vero vel falso habitui inclinanti; sed in proposito uterque habitus inclinat 
naturaliter et per modum naturae assensum praebet, sed error in assensu est ex parte obiecti 
sic vel sic occurrentis. […] Et ideo non est certior – quantum ad ‘non decipi’ – fides infusa 
quam acquisita.” 
53 John Duns Scotus, Rep. III, d. 23, §19 (WV 23: 442): “[D]ecipi et non decipi non est nisi 
per objecta diversa, quibus creditur, quae vere vel false praesentantur intellectui per habitum 
fidei inclinantem; ergo hoc non est propter habitus et assensus, qui non inclinant non habentes 
objecta, unde utrumque habentes naturaliter inclinantur, et per modum naturae assensum 
view that dispositions change the mode of assenting, that is, that they function as a kind of 
intellectual filter that changes the way certain objects appear to us. 
In the present case, the believer has an acquired habitus of faith through which everything 
that the Catholic church deems true appears true to him. So every time he thinks something is 
considered true by the Catholic church, he assents to it. There is nothing wrong with this 
habitus. Deception will occur only when someone I believe tells me that a certain object is 
deemed true by the Catholic church but this is not actually the case. But, one might answer 
Scotus, it is precisely the acquired habitus that is fallible, because it inclines one to assent to 
what the Catholic church deems true in general, but we have no way, through this habitus, to 
know what this actually is. The infused habitus, by contrast, is a gift of God: thus it is in its 
very nature to incline only towards assent to true objects. 
Scotus admits this without difficulty: infused faith always inclines to true objects, while 
acquired faith does not.54 But that does not prevent deception, for when infused faith inclines 
towards believing a certain object, it is impossible for the believer to know it: if he did, he 
would know that a habitus that can never incline someone to a false object inclines him to 
believe a given object. But then he would know that this object is true and would therefore not 
need to believe it. Therefore, it must be concluded that we can never know whether our acts of 
                                                                                                                                                   
praebent, in quo assensu error si sit, non erit ex parte habitus inclinantis, sed ex objectis falso 
occurrentibus; ergo secundum hoc non est certior fides infusa quam fides acquisita.” 
54 John Duns Scotus, Quodl., q. 14, §7 (WV 26: 11–12): “[F]ides infusa non potest inclinare 
ad aliquod falsum, inclinat autem virtute luminis divini, cujus est participatio, et ita non nisi 
ad illud quod est conforme illi lumini divino; actus igitur credendi inquantum innititur isti 
fidei, non potest tendere in aliquod falsum. […] Et quandocumque ad idem inclinat fides 
infusa et acquisita, tunc necessario acquisitae non subest falsum, non quod haec necessitas sit 
ex ipsa fide acquisita, sed ex infusa concurrente cum ipsa ad eumdem actum. Innititur igitur 
actus credendi fidei infusae tanquam regulae certae, et omnino infallibili, a qua actus habeat, 
quod non possit esse falsus; sed innititur acquisitae tanquam regulae minus certae, quia non 
per illam repugnaret actui, quod esset falsus, vel circa falsum objectum.” 
belief proceed from infused faith and acquired faith or merely from acquired faith.55 So 
infused faith does not lead us towards the objects of faith, simply because we never know 
when it is in act and when it is not. 
But then, what tells us what we should believe? Scotus is clear on this question: there can 
be no assent to the objects of faith when they are presented to the believer unless one has been 
taught that they should be believed. Experience shows this, according to Scotus: an 
uneducated person will never assent to an object of faith that has no evidence by itself.56 
While Bonaventure and Olivi granted man an inner compass, be it grace or instinct, for 
Scotus, experience shows that there can be no such thing. 
For all that, Scotus’s scenario is not a skeptical one. He believes that true faith can rely on 
teaching and transmission and that we can actually show, on the basis of Scripture and the 
history of the Catholic church, that the latter is likely truthful. He devotes a significant part of 
                                               
55 John Duns Scotus, Quodl., q. 14, §8 (WV 26: 12): “[N]on percipio me inclinari in actum 
per fidem infusam, sive secundum illam elicere actum; sed tantum percipio me assentire 
secundum fidem acquisitam, vel ejus principium, scilicet testimonium, cui credo, quia si 
perciperem me habere actum secundum fidem infusam, et cum hoc scirem quod secundum 
fidem infusam non potest haberi actus nisi determinate verus, perciperem quod actus meus 
non posset esse falsus, quia ex hoc sequitur quod perciperem quod objectum actus non posset 
esse falsum, et tunc scirem illud, id est, infallibiliter cognoscerem illud esse verum, quod 
nullus experitur in se, ut credo, quantumcumque aliquis habeat utramque fidem et secundum 
utramque assentiat.” 
56 John Duns Scotus, Lect. III, d. 23, n. 45 (Vat. 21: 114): “[S]i totus assensus sit ab ipso 
habitu fidei, tunc positis omnibus quae concurrunt ad actum credendi in esse primo, sequitur 
necessario actus credendi; sed ponatur aliquis baptizatus nunc, et occurrant sibi phantasmata 
istorum terminorum simplicium ‘mortui’ et ‘resurrectionis’, ex quo ponitur potentia habituata 
et necessario inclinata ex obiecto praesentato in phantasmate, sequitur necessario actus quo 
iste assentiret huic complexo ‘mortui resurgent’ , – quod falsum est: numquam enim, omnibus 
istis positis, plus assentiret quam ante, nisi prius esset edoctus de hoc articulo quod talis 
articulus est credendus; igitur videtur quod fides acquisita sufficit quae acquiritur ex auditu, 
nec experitur aliquis aliam cum tali assensu.” Lect. III, d. 25 (Vat. 21: 169–170): “Non sic est 
de fide; nec sufficit quicumque occursus credibilium ad intellectum, ad hoc quod habitus 
inclinet in actum firmiter eliciendum, – sicut patet de baptizato nunc, cui, si statim occurrant 
phantasmata istorum terminorum ‘mortui’ et ‘resurgere’, et componat apud se ‘mortui 
resurgent’, non oportet credere nisi prius constiterit sibi per aliquem quod sit articulus 
credendus.” 
the prologue to his Sentences commentary to showing just that.57 The problem is that the 
arguments Scotus uses to do this are only probable, and thus unable to produce the kind of 
doubtless certainty that is the hallmark of faith. For this, and to make faith meritorious, the act 
of faith needs to somehow depend on the believer’s will.58 
For Scotus, the will moves the intellect to assent as a “general moving motor.”59 To 
understand what this means, we must look at how the act of faith is produced. Duns Scotus 
lists the necessary factors: the terms of the proposition to be assented to must be apprehended 
and composed so that they form the proposition, and the habitus of acquired faith as well as 
that of infused faith must incline towards assent. Then the act of faith occurs.60 The will plays 
no role, except that it causes acquired faith “remotely” (ut remote).61 This can be explained as 
meaning, quite simply, that once the will has caused the habitus of faith to exist in the soul 
(by one previous act, one can surmise) it is no longer needed:62 the habitus does all the work 
                                               
57 See John Duns Scotus, Ordinatio, Prol., pars 2, q. un. (Vat. 1: 61–82). See also Faucher 
(2015, ch. 5, sect. II.3). 
58 John Duns Scotus, Lect. III, d. 23, n. 46 (Vat. 21: 114): “[S]i fides infusa praebeat talem 
perfectionem vel assensum per modum naturae inclinans potentiam in actum, cum termini 
articulorum possint apprehendi ante omnem actum voluntatis, sequitur quod actus credendi 
esset independens a voluntate, et ita non meritorius, et quod inesset homini naturaliter, – quod 
negat Augustinus dicens quod ‘cetera potest homo nolens, credere autem non nisi volens’; 
sequitur etiam quod sine fide acquisita, quia habitus perfectus non eget alio per quem 
praesentetur obiectum eius.” 
59 John Duns Scotus, Lect. III, d. 25, n. 45 (Vat. 21: 174): “[V]oluntas non movet ex non-
evidente ad assentiendum sibi statim, tamen movet ut generalis motor movens.” 
60 John Duns Scotus, Rep. III, d. 25, §12 (WV 23: 465): “Habita enim apprehensione 
terminorum, et facta compositione et fide acquisita, quam causat voluntas, et fide infusa 
inclinante, non virtute objecti, sed virtute voluntatis habet intellectus, unde credibilia moveant 
ad actum credendi. Dices, non sufficit tamen, sed cum fide acquisita et infusa, voluntas movet 
ad actum. Dico quod sufficit quod non contra moveat contra fidem acquisitam.” 
61 John Duns Scotus, Lect. III, d. 25, n. 45 (Vat. 21: 174): “[H]abita enim apprehensione 
terminorum, facta compositione et fide acquisita quam causat voluntas ut remote, et fide 
infusa inclinante (non virtute obiecti, sed virtute infundentis), habetur actus. Unde credibilia 
movent ad actum credendi, – non sufficienter tamen, sed cum fide acquisita et infusa.” 
62 John Duns Scotus, Lect. III, d. 25, n. 45 (Vat. 21: 173–174): “Et dico quod credibilia 
movent aliquo modo: quandoque ex fide acquisita, quandoque ex fide infusa; unde posita fide 
acquisita, non est voluntas necessaria.” Rep. III, d. 25, §12 (WV 23: 465): “[D]ico quod 
credibilia movent aliquo modo quandoque ex fide infusa; unde posita fide acquisita, non est 
voluntas necessaria.” 
and makes the intellect assent when it should. Accordingly, in contrast to Bonaventure and 
Olivi, Scotus locates the habitus of faith only in the intellect.63 If the will is unneeded in 
individual repeated acts of faith, there is no reason why it should have a habitus of faith. 
To summarize, we can say that Scotus’s conception of the habitus of faith is the result of a 
reduction motivated by the principle of parsimony: what we should posit is only what is 
absolutely necessary to account for our experience of acts of faith. Consequently, almost 
every supernatural element is eliminated from the equation, as well as what would separate 
faithful belief from ordinary belief: it is only because of the Catholic church’s teaching that 
we know what to believe, and it is through a natural act of the will unaided by grace or by any 
preceding natural instinct or habitus that we acquire the habitus of faith. 
Thus, this habitus of faith, at least the acquired one, is reduced to being merely the 
disposition of the intellect to adhere to the objects of faith. This disposition is extremely 
strong since by itself it constrains the intellect to assent, independently of any further 
involvement of the will, which neither Bonaventure nor Olivi seem to accept. In a way, 
Scotus’s habitus of faith can be said to be much more focused and much stronger as well. 
As for the infused habitus, it must be noted that, as opposed to most thirteenth-century 
thinkers, such as Alexander of Hales and Bonaventure among the Franciscans, Scotus thinks it 
does not replace or improve upon acquired faith but is complementary with it. Thus, 
whenever someone elicits by acquired faith an act of assent to a true object of faith, infused 
faith (provided the agent has it) is actualized in the very same act. 
This plays the crucial role of making the act of faith meritorious in the eyes of God. It also 
appears to make this act more voluntary, and not only to rule out that doubt could win over 
                                               
63 John Duns Scotus, Lect. III, d. 25, n. 40 (Vat. 21: 171–172): “Si quaeritur quid sit 
subiectum fidei, – respondeo quod intellectus est subiectum eius, quia perfectio prima ipsius 
intellectus est fides.” 
certainty (as acquired faith does) but also to eliminate doubt itself, which can be interpreted as 
meaning that movements of doubt simply do not occur anymore in the believer.64 As one can 
see, however, this infused habitus seems to play no causal role in the production of the act of 
assent itself, except for its meritorious character. In any case, it could certainly not play any 
perceptible role, for the reasons outlined above: if one knew that one’s act of faith is an act of 
supernatural faith, then one would know the object of this act to be true and so would not need 
to believe it any more. 
Conclusion 
As I have endeavoured to show, the habitus of faith can have very different roles for different 
authors in the thirteenth-century Franciscan tradition. For Bonaventure, the infused habitus 
helps pick out what should be believed, while for Olivi, such a function is devoted to a natural 
instinct that is not faith. As for Scotus, he thinks that nothing in man has such a function, and 
the believer should rely on the Catholic church. 
For Bonaventure, the habitus of faith “federates,” so to speak, several powers, including 
the intellect and the will, in order to accomplish one act of faith that is brought about by 
several previous acts. Olivi finds such a view acceptable, but introduces the possibility of a 
causal order between several partial habitus of faith, each devoted to a specific act leading to 
the act of faith, and inhering in only one power. Scotus pushes this fragmentation to its limit: 
                                               
64 John Duns Scotus, Lect. III, d. 23, n. 48 (Vat. 21: 116): “[N]on solum propter actum 
primum dat caritatem, sed propter actum secundum, ut sit perfectior et intensior actus 
diligendi ex potentia et caritate quam ex potentia tantum; […] sic hic de fide infusa, eodem 
modo proportionaliter, quia sicut caritas facit actum secundum perfectiorem in substantia 
actus quam fuit sine ea, sic fides.” 
See also Lect. III, d. 23, n. 49 (Vat. 21: 116–117): “Nec pono habitum fidei infusae solum 
propter gradum in actu, sed etiam propter assensum, quia assensus non est totaliter a 
voluntate. Aliqui enim sunt qui magis vellent assentire, et tamen minus assentiunt. […] Nec 
fides excludit omnem dubitationem, sed dubitationem vincentem et trahentem in oppositum 
credibilis.” 
the habitus of faith is reduced to being a habitus of the intellect, inclining its subject only to 
one type of truth-grasping act. 
In a way, for Scotus, and possibly for Olivi, the will occupies a position comparable to 
that of God in Bonaventure’s view: just as God infuses the habitus of faith independently of 
an act of the believer, the will seems to cause the habitus of faith to take hold in the intellect 
without the intellect eliciting an act. It is only when an object of faith is presented as such that 
it will adhere to it. As for the infused habitus, it contributes nothing perceptible to the act of 
faith inasmuch as it is an act of assent. It mostly makes this act acceptable to God and thus 
meritorious. 
The thirteenth century presents a varied picture of what makes the habitus of faith what it 
is and of its different possible functions. As time passes, it appears that models tend more and 
more towards simplified, focused, and mostly natural conceptions of this habitus. As we hope 
to have shown, the study of the different elaborations of the concept of faith in the Middle 
Ages, because it is at the crossroads of such concepts as habitus, virtue, will and intellect, and 
truth and goodness, provides an ideal vantage point from which to consider various different 
developments in medieval philosophy. 
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